Leaving aside the differing practical consequences of the application of the two theories, substantial theoretical and doctrinal arguments in each of their favour may be presented. 12 For example, in the case of a repudiatory dismissal by the employer, the application of the elective theory at common law first and foremost provides the innocent employee with a choice whether (and when) to (i) however, is that it often fails to coincide with factual reality. Once there has been a repudiatory dismissal or resignation, the employment relationship is over and the employment contract is de facto at an end. As such, conferring a choice in favour of the employee in the context of a wrongful dismissal -or the employer where there has been a wrongful resignation -is positively artificial.
Affording the innocent party the choice to terminate or affirm under the elective approach could have major financial implications -as in Mr Geys' case -but by no stretch of the imagination does it function to salvage the employment relationship.
Despite the fact that it goes against the grain of classic contractual principles, by making it clear that a repudiatory breach of the employment contract brings that relationship to an immediate end, the automatic theory, on the other hand, sits more comfortably not only with the practical realities of the employment relationship, but also with the common law principle that an employee cannot compel his employer to give him work, any more than an employer can compel an employee to work. 27 This, in turn, led him neatly on to address the often invoked debate surrounding the relationship between rights and remedies as a justification for the preference of the automatic theory. It has been pointed out elsewhere that the restrained attitude of the common law to a dismissed employee's remedies at common law has had a disproportionate impact on the rights afforded to an employee when the employer is in repudiatory breach of contract. 28 For example, the orthodox approach of the judiciary is to constrain the scope for injunctive relief and orders of specific performance in the case of the employment contract. 29 Ewing describes the debate in the following terms:
So the rights of the parties are to be driven and determined by the availability of remedies;
the contract is automatically terminated by the unilateral repudiation of either party, simply because it is not capable of specific performance. As such the argument is hopelessly One must be careful not to assume that, just because in practice the employee may have little choice but to accept the repudiation, he has in law no alternative but to do so. … If the law requires acceptance of the repudiation, the requirement is for a real acceptance -a conscious intention to bring the contract to an end, or the doing of something that is inconsistent with its continuation. In the final paragraphs of his judgment, Lord Wilson returned to the automatic theory and posed a number of questions which he suggested ought to be answered in order to explain how it could possibly apply, but did not expand upon or respond to these questions. In proposing that the court should indorse the automatic theory, the Bank invites it to cause the law of England and Wales in relation to contracts of employment to set sail, unaccompanied, upon a journey for which I can discern no just purpose and can identify no final destination. I consider, on the contrary, that we should keep the contract of employment firmly within the harbour which the common law has solidly constructed for the entire fleet of contracts in order to protect the innocent party, as far as practicable, from the consequences of the other's breach.
E. The dissenting judgment
Lord Sumption, in a compelling judgment, disagreed with Lord Wilson, arguing first that the case law relied upon in favour of the elective theory is much more nuanced than appears from his reasoning.
He suggested that:
The expression [of the 'elective theory'] is […] misleading because it suggests that the innocent party's right to treat the contract as subsisting necessarily flows from the unilateral character of the other party's repudiation. In fact, the right to treat the contract as subsisting has never been absolute. It is subject to important exceptions and qualifications. 
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F. Analysis
The analysis of the majority of the Supreme Court can be approached from two angles: the first operates at an abstract level, considering the implications of Geys for the innate nature of the common law of the employment contract, whereas the second line of enquiry is constructed along doctrinal lines, focussing attention on the impact of Geys on the internal coherence of the law.
Geys in context
The Supreme Court's adoption of the elective theory in Geys can be examined in light of its jurisprudence in a series of recent cases relating to the common law of the contract of employment: If we begin with Geys, the fact that the Supreme Court applied general principles of contract law in the context of the common law of the contract of employment might lead us to the conclusion that the courts are committed to adopting rules and principles which ensure that the employment contract is nothing special so that it is treated the same as any other contract, without exception. For example, noting that the elective theory applied in other areas of contract law, such as wrongful terminations of the contract for services, Lord Wilson referred to the absurdity of the suggestion that a chasm should be opened up in contract law by the adoption of the automatic theory of termination in the common law of the contract of employment. Of course, the question arises as to why the courts sometimes apply contractual principle, occasionally modify it, and in other cases plainly abandon it. That question is closely aligned to the issue of the wider effect of Geys on employment law as an autonomous discipline. Ultimately, the contemporary judicial recognition of a conception of employment that transcends simple economic transactions and exchanges to reflect the social reality of subordination in the relationship 64 gives rise to powerful policy considerations which dictate whether contractual orthodoxy ought to be adhered to or discarded. The realisation that legal doctrine and precedent must give way to policy in Although it is undoubtedly true to say that the policy objectives underpinning various rules of the common law of the contract of employment can be modified by the judiciary and have indeed advanced in a socially progressive manner in recent times, 67 e.g. by analogy with the growth in statutory employment protection 68 and in response to de-collectivisation and de-unionisation, 'deregulation of the labour market, the privatisation of public services, and the globalisation of product and financial markets', 69 Lord Sumption reminds us in Geys that it is inaccurate to characterise the common law as a primary sources of norms in the workplace operating exclusively in a worker-friendly direction. 70 Sometimes, as in Edwards
71
, the compelling policy issues identified in a particular case by the court will be contrary to the interests of labour whereas in others, such as Autoclenz, Gisda Cyf and Geys, they will not. Ultimately, the issue is one of balancing competing interests.
In Geys, the Supreme Court placed a great deal of emphasis on justice and party autonomy as the grounds for its decision in favour of the employee. However, one must not underestimate the power of policy preferences based on certainty and practicability or on considerations of acting in a way which does not frustrate parliamentary intention. Yet while policy issues will vary, a clearer picture as to the orientation of a doctrinally independent common law of the contract of employment is bound to eventually emerge. 
Doctrinal effect of Geys
Not only does Geys provide an insight into the prevailing attitude of the courts to the direction of the development of the common law of the employment contract, it also has importance for our understanding of the doctrinal framework of that contract. Here we pursue the implications of a number of more radical lines of development in doctrine opened up by Geys. First, we will explore the point made in Geys that the elective theory also applies to express resignations. Second, we will address the impact of the theory on summary dismissals. Finally, we will consider the elective theory's interaction with the mutuality principle in Scots law and the traditional hostility of the common law courts to the awarding of orders of specific performance.
First, Geys explicitly applies the elective theory to wrongful resignations. In such a context, one might think that its application is an affront to the principle of liberty so intrinsic to common law jurisprudence, 73 as well as being impractical and unlawful, 74 since it would appear to enable an employer to coerce an employee to continue working against his will. However, this objection is illusory for two reasons. First, common law rules designed 75 to prevent a contracting party from forcing unwanted performance on the counterparty and then claiming payment could be adapted to limit some of the more oppressive aspects of the elective theory. 76 Second, statutory inroads into the common law have been made by section 236 of TULR(C)A which precludes an employer from obtaining injunctive relief or an order of specific performance compelling the employee to do any work or attend at any place for the doing of any work. As such, faced by a wrongful resignation, the most that an employer could do is compel the employee to take garden leave for the period of his contractual notice period, which may give rise to the judicial recognition of an implied term empowering employers to put employees on garden leave in the absence of a power to do so performance of the contract subsequent to the employee's wrongful resignation, the court has the power to exercise its general equitable jurisdiction and refuse to permit the employer to insist on its strict legal rights.
pursuant to an express term. 77 During that period, the employee will continue to be bound by obligations of mutual trust and confidence pursuant to the implied terms of the employment contract, albeit that he cannot be forced to perform work against his will.
As for the impact of the elective theory on the law of repudiatory breach and termination of the contract of employment, two key issues arise. The first is generic in nature, but the second pertains specifically to Scots law. First, the elective theory has serious implications for the law of summary dismissal. Consider the situation where the employee is caught stealing by the employer and the employer summarily dismisses the employee without notice on the ground of gross misconduct, i.e.
that the employee has committed a repudiatory breach. The employee then responds by refuting the employer's contention that he is guilty of gross misconduct, claims that the employer's summary dismissal is itself a repudiatory breach and affirms the contract of employment without delay. The question which arises is whether the employer should pay lost wages as a debt from the moment of the employee's affirmation, together with contractual damages for its failure to provide the requisite notice. The difficulty that the employer has is that it will not know whether the summary dismissal was valid on the basis of the employee's gross misconduct until an employment tribunal or court declares it to be so some time later. In the meantime, the employer is left in the unenviable position of deciding whether (i) to take its chances on the tribunal or court subsequently finding that the summary dismissal was valid and refuse to pay the employee notice damages and lost pay or (ii) pay the employee notice damages and lost pay whilst reserving its position and then go to court to recover this sum on the basis that the employee was guilty of gross misconduct and the summary dismissal was valid. This strikes the writers as a somewhat contrived dynamic, which opens up a degree of peril for employers. 
